Conclusions: the political dilemma of immigration

Our review has revealed an important division in views of immigration. At one pole are those who accept it as an integral, and usually valuable, part of British social and economic life, and who favour a pragmatic and broadly liberal policy framework. The highly educated, middle-class professionals who dominate the political parties as well as other key social institutions fall into this group, which constitutes about a third of the public. At the other pole are the sceptics, who account for around half of the population. They strongly oppose immigration at current levels, and feel it is doing severe economic and social damage to Britain. They tend to oppose all forms of immigration, which they see as economically and socially costly, and favour much more restrictive policies. Many people in this group – around a fifth of the public as a whole –
feel very strongly about the issue. 

This social divide creates problems for policy makers for three reasons. Firstly, any policy which satisfies those on one side of the divide will anger those on the other side of the divide. Secondly, policy makers and the interest groups they deal with regularly tend to be drawn heavily from the liberal end of the spectrum, creating a potential for disconnect and distrust between a more liberal political class which accepts immigration and an electorate among whom many find it intensely threatening. Thirdly, in many areas of migration policy, constraints on current policy mean it is more liberal than even the most pro-migration parts of the public would like, generating widespread public discontent which is hard to address. For example, EU rules make it very hard for the government to restrict migrant numbers, or regulate migrant access to the welfare state, in accordance with the wishes of most of the public. 

This combination of persistent public anxiety, the
disconnect in attitudes between political elites and voters, and constraints on policy makers’ ability to respond have helped to fuel the rise in support for UKIP, who have been most successful among those who are most anxious about immigration. This is clear in Table 5.9 which shows the proportions identifying with different political parties among the four groups we have considered throughout this chapter. Among those who are strongly negative about immigration, 13 per cent identify with UKIP, compared to just 1 per cent among those with positive views of migration (see also Ford and Goodwin, 2014). While Labour are relatively weaker among anti-immigration voters than among pro-immigration voters, both of the big two parties have reasons to worry about UKIP competition, as large numbers of the most anti-immigration voters also identify with each of these parties. The Liberal Democrats have the least to fear from UKIP competition, as they prosper among the pro-migration section of the electorate, where UKIP are absent, and have virtually no identifiers among the strongly negative respondents. 

The emergence of UKIP is generating a dilemma for policy makers in the governing parties. Although UKIP competition creates a short-term demand for restrictive migration policies, such policies in turn may cause problems for them in the longer run. Advocating strongly restrictive immigration policies risks alienating the more liberal third of the population, and given constraints on policy and high political distrust, may not convince the most anti-immigration voters anyway. Moreover, long-term demographic change is moving society in the opposite direction, because the most pro-migration social groups – university graduates and professionals – are steadily growing, while the most anti-migration groups – unskilled manual workers and those with no qualifications – are in sharp decline.[6] This is the political dilemma of immigration: there is a clear, and intense, demand for action on the issue from one section of the electorate, a demand politicians ignore at their peril. Yet responding to the concerns of the voters worried about immigration today risks alienating the rising sections of the electorate whose political voice will become steadily louder in elections to come.